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Social scientists have an intuitive notion of what "power" 
infers, but have been unable to define it rigorously enough 
for use in a systematic study of this social phenomenon. 
Adopting a social systems perspective, the paper focuses 
on the historical development, empirical utility, and the 
integration of the theoretical dimension of the concept. 
In addition, the process by which subsystems form larger 
operating units is explored with attention being given to 
the development of power relationships among them. 
Introduction 
Most social scientists have an intuitive notion of what 'power' means. 
Yet, social scientists have been unable to formulate a statement of the 
concept that is rigorous enough to be used in a systematic study of this 
important social phenomenon. The more social scientists attempt to define 
power, the more complex it is found to be. 
To say that certain individuals have more or less "power" than others 
is one of the palpable facts of human existence. Parent-child, chief-
patrolman, professor-graduate student, professional-amateur are all 
relationships which imply the notion of power (Peabody, 1964). The concept 
of power is as ancient as any that social theory can boast. To document 
this assertion, one could cite a series of social philosophers from Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto, Mosca, Weber 
and Durkheim to demonstrate that a large number of seminal theorists have 
devoted a great amount of their thought to the concept of power and the 
implications associated with it (Dahl, 1957). 
Because so many social scientists, at varying times in history have 
felt the need to attach the label 'power' to some Thifig they believed they 
had observed, one is tempted to think that the Thing must exist. Beyond 
existing, the Thing must be of a form capable of being studied in an 
empirical manner. Many social scientists have thought of power as existing 
even in a "potential" state. The notion of "potentiality" has persuaded 
social scientists to use indirect measures of power and often it has 
prompted them to ask rhetorical questions about the relationship between 
desirable social facts (e.g., class stratification) and power. 
Another group of theorists have conceived of power as being 'actual'. 
Simply, (X) has power over (Y) to the extent that he QOcan yet (Y) to do 
something that (Y) would not otherwise do. This definition allows its 
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users to empirically look at power relations, whereas those theorists who 
describe power in terms of 'potentiality' find it much more difficult to 
rely on empirical verification (Dahl, 1957). More attention will be given 
to the limitations of both of these approaches further on. 
Definitions of Power 
Although social scientists define power in a multitude of ways, most of 
them understand what others mean when they use the concept of 'power'. One 
common factor in all definitions of power is the agreement that the concept 
infers a certain amount of displacement of energy. A sample of the spectrum 
of definitions of power that one is likely to discover in reviewing the 
literature follows: 
Blau: Power is all kinds of influence 
between persons or groups, including 
those exercised in exchange transactions, 
where one induces others to accede to his 
wishes by rewarding them for doing so. 
(Blau, 1964) 
Brown: Power is the influence exerted by 
a man or a group, through whatever means, 
over the conduct of others in intended 
ways. (Hoult, 1969) 
Goldhammer and Shils: A person has 
power to the extent that he influences 
the behavior of others in accordance 
with his own intentions. (Goldhammer 
and Shils, 1939) 
Weber: Power is the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will, despite 
resistances, regardless of the basis on which 
this probability rests. (Weber, 1947) 
Bierstedt: Power is latent force. (Bierstedt, 
T9S7TJ 
Hobbes: Power is a man's ability to obtain 
some future apparent goods, (Parsons, 1937) 
Lasswell and Kaplan: Power is participation 
in the making of decisions. (Lasswell and 
Kaplin, 1950) 
Parsons: Power is an actors ability to induce 
òFlrrfTuence another actor to carry out his 
directives or any other norms that he supports. 
(Litterer, 1968) 
Banfield: Power is the ability to establish 
control over another. (Banfield, 1961) 
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Dahl : (A) has power over (B) to the extent that 
{AJ can get (B) to do something that (B) would 
not otherwise~do. (Dahl, 1957) 
These orientations towards the concept of power can be categorized into 
two specific schools of thought towards the concept. The first of these 
schools can be labeled the individualistic school. This school of thought 
is represented in Weber's definition of the concept, as well as in, 
the definitions of Goldhammer and Shils, Hobbes, Banfield, and Parsons. 
Focusing upon Weber's definition of the concept, it is recognized that his 
orientation to 'power' perceives power as focusing on the probability that 
single actor achieves his desired goals. Weber's definition, and those 
who accept his notion of the concept, is sociologically limiting in that 
it does not consider other actors, nor does it consider the social structure 
of the system within which the action takes place. (It should be pointed 
out that an 'actor' is not restricted to an individual, but rather, an 
'actor' can be an individual, group, complex organization, etc.) (Aiken 
and Mott, 1968.) 
A second school of thought is represented by theorists who have 
gathered around Robert Dahl. Dahl, and his followers, have developed a 
dyadic orientation towards the concept. From Dahl's orientation, ppwer 
is conceived of as a relationship between two actors, where one actor 
is able to bring about a change in the second actor. For Dahl, this change 
is represented as an alteration in activity, belief, or something else 
(Dahl, 1957). Essentially, this school of thought sees power as a 
relational variable. Quite obviously, a major limitation of this school 
is that it does not make any reference to goals or to the broader social 
structure. This school of thought is solely concerned with the situation 
where (X) has power over (¥) to the extent that he can get (Y) to do some-
thing that (Y) would not do otherwise. 
A fundamental distinction between the individualistic school and the 
dyadic school is that those theorists who hold to the latter position 
perceive power as a forcing or persuading attribute in a person or a 
relationship, (a relational variable) whereas those theorists who ascribe 
to an individualistic orientation imply power to exist in the potential 
or the capacity to act. 
For this paper, power is perceived to be more than what is implied 
by either of these two orientations. We do not disagree with the implication 
of the individualistic oriented theorists who argue that power can reside 
in the potential to act; power is more than that. In this paper, 'power' 
will be considered to be: the potential ability of an actor or actors 
to select, to change, and to attain the goals of the social system within 
which they operate. Contrasting this approach to those previously stated, 
we can see that it differs considerably from either of the schools just 
discussed. First, power is not an attribute of a single actor. If this 
were true, then an implication evolving from this would be that the actor 
who is powerful in one social system is equally powerful in another. We 
suggest that an individual actor can be considered powerful only in terms 
of the social structure that he is operating within. Furthermore, it is 
difficult (if not impossible) for an actor to transfer his power to a 
second social structure in a manner so that his power in the system he 
transferred te is as great in the beginning as it was in the system from 
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which he transferred. Secondly, power is not seen as a property between 
two actors. Even though an actor may have a great deal of influence over 
a second actor in one system, the relationship may change when the two 
actors are in a second social structure. Furthermore, it is simplistic to 
perceive of power as existing in a dyadic relationship. (As Dahl and 
others do.) This paper advocates the position that a 'power relation1 can 
exist between more than two actors, and quite often does. 
The orientation put forth in this paper emphasizes as its basic unit 
actors who are operating in one or more status positions within a specific 
social system. This orientation focuses on the abilities of various actors 
to restrict the inputs into the system, to convert the imputs into specific 
demands, to redirect the flows of decisions within the system, and to 
regulate the output of the system. (This approach concerns itself with 
"dual power positions.") Further, this orientation considers the potential 
ability of actors to bring about changes in a particular social system, 
hence, we speak of power structures. 
Properties (Dimensions) of Power 
For the purposes of clarification, the concept of 'actor(s)' is not 
confined to individuals, but rather, 'actor(s)' may be individuals, groups, 
neighborhoods, communities, nation-states, or any other composite of human 
aggregates. In a group there is no individual action operating independently 
of the group. Within a group there is joint action or individuals' actions 
representing the entire group. 
From a review of the literature, seven properties of power have been 
developed. Each property is discussed below so that a more complete under-
standing of the concept of power will emerge. 
(1) Power refers to a relation among two or more things. Power does 
not necessarily have to exist between two or more animate objects. A 
person, group, or community can have power over a certain inanimate object 
and consequently have power over another actor(s), but the power relation 
is independent upon the inanimate object, To illustrate; suppose a con-
tractor desires to construct a building which is dependent upon the allocation 
of city funds. Although the city council has no power directly over the 
individual, they do have direct control of the funds; thereby giving them 
indirect control over the contractor. As a result, the power of the alloca-
tion of the funds becomes the linkage in the power relationship. Power 
cannot exist between a single actor and himself, but rather, it involves a 
relationship between two or more objects so that a power relation can develop 
in the form of an aggregate. Essentially, power relationships are more than 
dyadic as was implied by Dahl's constituent. 
A power relation can exist whether or not there is a clash of interests 
between the actors. What is necessary is that one of the actors cause 
the other actor(s) to alter his/their behavior. In one instance, a power 
relationship exists when one actor wants a specific task performed in one 
way and a second actor wants the task performed in another way (clash of 
interests). Yet, a power relation can also exist when there is not a clash 
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of interests between the actors. For example, a boss has power over his 
secretary although there is no clash of interests between the two actors 
(Weber refers to this as authority; which is noncoercive power). The 
secretary carries out his/her duties because his/her superior represents a 
symbol of power (potential power). 
By inferring power to be a relation among two or more objects, it 
should be understood that at least two of the objects realize that a 
relationship exists between them,. Suppose a person stands on a street 
corner and says to himself, "I demand that all automobile drivers on this 
street drive on the right-hand side of the road"; suppose further that all 
the automobile drivers actually did as the individual commanded them to do; 
still, many people in our society would consider the person to be mentally 
ill (deficient) if the person continued to insist that hè had enough power 
over automobile drivers to compel them to drive on the right-hand side of 
the road. Suppose, however, that a law enforcement officer is standing in 
the middle of an intersection at which the traffic moves towards him; he 
orders all of the automobile drivers to turn right or left; they move as 
he orders them to do. Acting in his particular role, the law enforcement 
officer has the power to compel the drivers to follow his directives, 
whereas few people would argue that the person on the street corner had this 
power (Dahl, 1957). 
(2) "Power Potentiality." Alterations in an actor's behavior does not 
have to be the result of an overt action by the powerful actor, but rather 
any alterations may be a consequence of 'potential power 1. Take the following 
example: suppose further that he continues to do so until he sees a law 
enforcement officer, in his patrol car, parked on the side of the road 
ahead of him. Because the person has observed the law enforcement officer, 
a symbol of power, there is a high probability that the automobile driver 
will slow down to the appropriate speed limit. The explanation why the 
automobile driver will slow down is in relation to the fact that be does 
not want to receive a citation (negative sanction) from the law enforcement 
officer; the automobile drive anticipates the police officer's reaction to 
his behavior (speeding) if he is caught and alters it. 
(3) Time Lag. There mast be a lag in time from the actions of the power-
ful actor to the responses of the subordinate actor(s). If there is no time 
lag between the actor who it is thought exerts power to the response of the 
other actor(s), how would a researcher determine the powerful actor? For 
illustrative purposes, refer to the following quotation: 
This condition, obvious as it is, is critically 
important in the actual study of power relations. 
Who runs the XYZ Corporation? Whenever the 
president announces a new policy, he immediately 
secures the compliance of the top officials. But 
upon further investigation it turns out that every 
new policy he announces has first been put to him 
by the head of the sales division. Or again, 
suppose we had a full record of the times at 
which each of the top Soviet leaders revealed his 
positions on various issues; we could then deduce 
a great deal about who is running the show and 
who is not. (Dahl, 1957) 
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In other words, one actor (X) can hardly be thought to have power 
over another actor (Y) unless (Xjs) specific power attempts preceed (Y_'s) 
specific responses. 
(4) Reciprocal Relationship. A power relationship is often considered 
to be an asymmetrical interpersonal influence relationship (Clark, 1967). 
There are essentially two forms of asymmetry that need to be presented. 
One form of asymmetry in the dyad relationship is primarily based on 
attraction. One member of the dyad as a result of special qualities 
attractive to the other member, motivates the person: (1) to want to be with 
him/her, though not necessarily to follow him/her; (2) to imitate his 
behavior; and (3) to follow his example or command. (French and Raven refer 
to this as referent power) (Schermerhorn, 1961). A second form of symmetry in 
the pair relationship occurs through pressure from above and submission from 
below. A fundamental distraction between this form of asymmetry and the 
previously discussed one is that in the case of attraction there is 
spontaniety, while under pressure there is effort and constraint (Schermerhorn, 
1961). 
(5) Indirect Influence. Indirect influence is indicative in the 
situation where one actor influences a second, third, and fourth actor 
through an intermediary. The distinction between 'power potentiality' and 
'indirect influence' then becomes obvious. 'Power potentiality' refers 
to a recognition of a symbol of power (law enforcement officer, corporation 
boss, mayor, etc.), whereas, indirect influence refers to the situation where 
an actor or object (Clark, 1967). (Object is used in this writing to refer 
to anything that is inanimate.) 
(6) Scope of Power. An actor's power does not affect all other actors 
in precisely the same manner. An actor has more power over certain actors 
than he does over others (Clark, 1967). For example, the Catholic Church 
has much more power over members of the church than it does over an atheist!! 
(7) Power Legitimacy. Power has a certain degree of legitimacy 
associated with it, yet it is quite different from what is implied by 
'status' or 'prestige' and 'authority'. Status or prestige is a subjective 
evaluation of an individual or group by 'certain' other people. Power and 
status (prestige) quite often coincide together in a symbiotic relationship, 
yet the two concepts are not synonymous. It is quite possible for an 
individual to have 'status', but little power; like the dethroned king. 
Also, one may have a lot of power, but little status in the society; like 
the late mafia leader, Al Capone (Clark, 1967). 
Another concept, quite often confused with 'power' is 'authority' 
(Peabody, 1964). Social scientists have attempted to resolve this 
dichotomy between 'authority' and 'power' by defining the exercise of 
authority in terms of force with the "general approval" of those concerned. 
Another way that authority and power have been differentiated is by treating 
authority and power as different types of relationships among people 
(Peabody, 1964). 
A second distinction between 'authority' and 'power' is that the 
exercise of authority enables administrators to justify or criticize the 
actions taken, but the exercise of power per se, bears no such relation. 
From research conducted, (Regoli, 1971) it is inferred that the pronounce-
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ments of authority are not merely fiats that must be obeyed, but rather, they 
also function as standards for the individual administrator's own appraisal 
of their own behavior. When differentiating between authority and power at 
the community level, it appears as if authority is often implicitly or 
explicitly denied to people who have power, and it is often invested in 
people who do not have the ability to bring about force and coercion to 
bear upon others (Peabody, 1964). Under such circumstances, those in 
authority positions are considered to be enti ti ed to get others to do certain 
things, whereas those who are considered to have power alone merely have 
the ability to force individuals to perform specific tasks. Authority is a 
subdivision (sub"unit) of power in that all authority is power, but not all 
power is necessarily authority. 
Realizing various dimensions of the power variable, a question that 
comes to mind is: What effects does a particular culture have on power 
relationships? Obviously some; those are referred to in terms of various 
mechanisms of integration. Much of the literature dealing with the concept 
of power makes little use of the notion as it applied to entities larger 
than a group consisting of two people. Furthermore, even when the literature 
does discuss larger entities, it often fails to discuss the effect of culture 
on the power relationships within or between entities. 
Mechanisms of Integration 
As a social system becomes differentiated, it must integrate its primary 
subsystems with one another unless it is to disintegrate. There are 
primarily five mechanisms of integration that will be considered. For purposes 
of clarity the concept 'integration' means to bring together; "Differentiation 
means 'becoming different', and for this writing 'social system' refers to a 
"set of interacting persons or groups, conceived of as distinct from the 
particular persons who compare it." (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1970.) 
As defined by Loomis, the social system is composed of the patterned inter-
action of members. A social system consists of a plurality of individual 
actors. The individual actors are related to each other in that each seeks 
goal attainment through the definition of structured and shared symbols of 
expectations. The reason that individuals participate in social systems 
is that they feel that through concernted action in cooperation with others 
they can optimize the attainment of certain goals more easily than if they 
all worked in opposition to one another. As soon as individuals find themselves 
in the social system that comes into existence because of this prior choice, 
they become identified with goals and means which are not those of any one 
individual, but of the social system. (Bohlen et al., 1965) In a society 
there are various levels of social systems. Social systems are represented 
in the interaction of two people, the family, the school, the church, the 
corporation, the community, and the nation. Characteristic to each of 
these social systems is that the members interact with one another more than 
they do with non-members of their social system. 
Integration is a functional problem that all societies face when their 
primary socializing bodies begin to become differentiated. In order for a 
society to maintain its existence integration must take place. Also, in most 
societies more than one of these five mechanisms of integration are usually 
operating at the same time. 
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General Values: Institutionalized 
Before a social system differentiates into sub-systems, there is usually 
an institutionalized general value system. The general values are reiterated 
and reinforced by the sub-systems of the social system. This is the point 
where the importance of societal norms is important. (Clark, 1967} 
Normative Reinforcement 
A second mode of integration is the inculcation and reinforcement of 
norms relating to the performance of specific roles in the social system. 
The principal mechanisms for such integration are the formal and informal 
organizations of individuals occupying similar statuses. (Clark, 1967) 
Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy, extends from the previous mechanisms for integration, but 
yet it is a distinctive type in itself. Quite obviously, as long as a 
bureaucracy has control over two or more subsectors of a social system 
it has the capability to integrate them with one another. (Clark, 1967) 
Juridical System 
A fourth mechanism that contributes to this integrative function is 
the juridical system. The juridical system plays this role by enforcing 
the general norms and values of the society. The knowledge that behind a 
general societal structure of norms and values there lies legal sanction 
to punish deviants generally suffices to control most people in the society. 
(Clark, 1967) 
Interchange Between Sub-systems 
The interchange referred to here can be anything in the range from 
symbolic gestures to a specific commodity. The exchange between sub-
systems leads to the development of role-related norms. These norms that 
emerge from this interchange between sub-systems can grow into laws and 
become institutionalized as values of the society (Clark, 1967). It is this 
mechanism of integration that is considered to be of primary importance 
for a discussion of the relationship between 'norms' and 'values' in reference 
to societal power structures. 
Interchange-Exchange Among Actors 
Interaction can be considered to be a process of exchange, each of the 
actors gives to the other actor(s) his time and attention. As actors 
continue to interact, they communicate their thoughts to one another. As 
a consequence of this a number of interaction patterns may develop. First 
of all, if each of the two actors do about half of the communicating and 
exchange equal amounts of information (or whatever else might be involved) 
then balanced interaction exists among the actors. However, if one of the 
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actors does more communicating, or gives more information than the other 
actor(s) an imbalance will result. If by chance this situation continues 
over a long period of time, the actor who is doing all of the giving is 
likely to get tired of his role. The situation needs to be corrected. This 
can be done in various ways. The easiest way to rectify the situation is 
for the actor(s) who has/have been receiving all of the information to begin 
to return information to the other actor. In doing this, the relationship 
will move towards a state of equilibrium. By being in equilibrium, the 
participants are able to react to change in such a way as to minimize the 
change's impact on the relation between them. (Clark, 1967) A second way 
to correct the imbalance is for the communication between the actors to be 
terminated. Here the actors (two, three, or however many) will decide that 
further interaction is not interesting to any of them, and they may each go 
their separate ways. A third alternative to correct this imbalance is the 
creation of a power relation between the actors. For illustrative purposes, 
let us take the case that involves two actors. It is possible that the 
silent actor in an impersonal power relationship finds the relationship 
rewarding, and does not want to terminate it. Further, it is also possible 
that this actor is not capable of reciprocating with commodities or with 
information that is considered attractive to the other actor so as to keep 
him interested in maintaining the relationship. It is at this point that 
the actor who seeks to continue the relationship must do one of three 
things. He can try to change the situation within which the interaction 
takes place. Secondly, he may give the other actor some commodity (i.e., 
money) that was not initially in the relationship. Third, the actor may 
offer himself as a commodity in exchange. This is obviously an extension 
of the second alternative, but the sociological implications raised by this 
action are many. The most important is that in offering himself as a 
commodity in exchange the relationship between the two actors taken on a new 
form. The new form is that an imbalance of power has been established between 
the actors. (Clark, 1967) 
From an exchange theory perspective of power relationship exists when 
one actor is able to offer something to the other actor(s) that place them 
in his debt. Whatever intrinsic rewards are defined as valuable by the 
majority of the actors can create the situation of indebtedness to one actor. 
For example, the actor who is able to offer efficient means to all of the other 
actors for the attainment of their goals places all of the other actors in a 
situation of being indebted to him. This remains the case as long as the 
attainment of the goals involved are valued by a majority of the actors. 
The entire process of exchange and interaction does not terminate here. 
There are specific norms that dictate the operating procedures of the 
system. In other words, there are particular 'rules of the game' that 
further define the power relationship between actors. First of all, the 
actor (any actor) is obliged to accept a gift that is offered to him. 
Gouldner argues that it is a 'rule of the game* not to refure a give, 
especially g"ifts given with no immediate reciprocal action implied. A 
second norm is that every actor must offer gifts to other actors in the 
system. A third 'rule of the game* is an extension of the previous two. 
It is the norm of reciprocity. Reciprocity can be accomplished in more 
than one way. An actor can reciprocate by giving a gift, one gift is 
exchanged for another gift. A second way that an actor can reciprocate is 
that one gift is exchanged for another gift in different sort. Third, 
certain institutionalized norms such as altruism, can sanction occasional 
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exceptions from the norm of reciprocity. Fourth, there may be a large 
amount of difference in power among the actors in the system so that 
altruistic norms may be institutionalized as a sort of escape value for 
pressures that build within the system. (Clark, 1967) 
Norms and Values 
There is no social action (power relationships included) that is not 
to some degree regulated by norms and values. (Even moral and social 
integration from a Durkheimism perspective boils down to a normative basis.) 
For this writing, norms and values will be distinguished as follows. 
Norms are considered to be required or acceptable behavior for a specific 
interactional situation. Norms accomplished the task of providing an actor 
with standards for behaving, as well as providing standards for judging 
behavior. (Betrand, 1972) Finally, norms will be considered to be the 
smallest element of a social structure. Most social action takes place 
within a structure of norms and values without changing them at all, and 
if they are changed, the change is minimal. Two basic distinctions between 
norms and values will be made: (Bertrand, 1972) 
1. Values derive from culture, and thus are considered 
matters of collective welfare. 
2. Although norms also derive from culture, they are 
specific in nature, and apply and find their 
expression as rules for concrete behavior. 
Furthermore, values can be distinguished from norms by making the 
following qualities explicit in what is meant by the concept 'values': 
(Bertrand, 1972) 
1. Values have a conceptual element which is more 
profound than mere sensations, emotions, or needs. 
2. Values are affectively charged, or involve some 
understanding which has an emotional aspect. 
3. Values are not concrete goals of action, but they 
do relate to goals in that they serve as criteria 
for their selection. 
4. Values are important matters and not the least 
trivial to the individual. 
The distinction between norms and values becomes conceptually clear under 
the assumption that norms represent behavior which is required and fixed. 
Summarily, power refers to an institutionalized set of arrangements 
among actors; hence, power refers to a system of norms and values. Further-
more, norms and values are specific to a particular culture. The process by 
which norms and values become institutionalized in the social system are quite 
similar to the way that a single actor gains control over another actor(s). 
It is through the same general process of increasing the social system's 
members indebtedness to a skillful leader that a system of norms and values 
are institutionalized that legitimate the dependency relationship. A skill-
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fui leader often allows the number of debts owed to him by other actors to 
increase beyond the number of demands that he makes upon the other actors in 
the social system. By doing this a leader increases the other actor(s) 
indebtedness to him and insures their support. As the relationship continues, 
the other actors interact with one another, and with the leader. From the 
interaction emerges a set of norms which institutionalize and legitimate 
the dependency relationship. Once the norms have been established, they 
operate as an independent mechanism of social control. This comes about 
because each actor in the system is constrained in his interaction with 
other members of the system tó conform with the generally accepted norms 
(Bertrand, 1972). 
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